Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1971

Thomas R. Broadbent v. United St Ates Fidelity and
Guaranty Company : Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errorsRex J. Hanson; Attorney for Plaintiff and AppellantRay R.
Christensen; Attorney for Defendant and Respondent
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Broadbent v. United States Fidelity, No. 12263 (Utah Supreme Court, 1971).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/237

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
RE-STATEMENT OF FACTS --------------------------------------------------------------

1

STATEMENT OF POINTS ----------------------------------------------------------------POINT I - THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, ERRED IN ENTERING SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANT
AND RESPONDENT UNITED STATES FIDELITY
AND GUARANTY COMPANY.

3

ARGUMENT ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------POINT I

3

A.

R
C.
D.

E.

PLAINTIFF GAVE TIMELY NOTICE -------------------------- 3
LATE NOTICE, IF ANY, IS EXCUSED SINCE
PLAINTIFF REASONABLY BELIEVED NO CLAIM
FOR INJURIES WOULD RESULT------------------------------- 6
LATE NOTICE, IF ANY, IS EXCUSED SINCE DEFENDANT WAS NOT PREJUDICED THEREBY ________ 7
PLAINTIFF'S REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS AS
A LAY PURCHASER OF LIABILITY INSURANCE
SHOULD BE REWARDED ------------------------------------------------- 9
THIS CASE IS NOT RIPE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 13

CONCLUSION -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 14
CASES CITED
Amundson v. Mutual Benefit, Health & Acc. Assoc., 13 U.2d 407,
375 P.2d 463 (1962) ----------------------------------------------------------------------4, 5, 6
Anderson v. Beneficial Fire & Cas. Co., 21 U.2d 173, 442 P.2d
933 (1968) -------------------------------------------------------·------·-----------·----·------------ 4
Bergh v. Canadian Universal Insurance Company, 197 So.2d 847,
(Fla. App. 1967) ------------·---------------·-----------------------------··-----------·--------3, 4
Cooper v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 51 N.J. 86, 237 A.2d
870 (1968) ----------------------------·---------------------------------------------·-----------·----- 8
Dunn v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 100 Utah 111, 110 P.2d 561
( 1941) ----- ---------------------- .. ---------. ----------·------·----··----------·-------------------------- 4
Falk v. Sul America Terrestres Maritimos E. Accidentes
Companhia De Seguros, 465 P.2d 714 (Ore. 1970) -------·-------·----3, 4
Frank v. Nash, 166 Pa. Super. 476, 71 A.2d 835 (1950)____________________ 8

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

Page

French v. Bekins Moving & Storage Co., 118 Colo. 424, 195 P.2d
968 (1948) ··············································································
11
Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 409 P.2d 168 (1966) .... 9, 12
Henningson v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69
(1960) .............................................................................................. 10, 11
Hoel v. Flower City Fuel & Transfer Co., 144 Minn. 280, 175
N.W. 300 (1919) .................................................................................. 11
Johnson Ready-Mix Concrete v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 11 U.2d
279, 358 P.2d 337 (1961) .................................................................... 6

Jones v. Great Northern Railway Co., 68 Mont. 231, 217 P. 673
11
(1923) ····················································································
Joyce v. United Ins. Co., 21 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1962) ................................ 8
Lindus v. Northern Ins. Co., 103 Ariz. 160, 438 P.2d 311 (1968) ...... 8
Los Angeles Inv. Co. v. Home Savings Bank, 180 Cal. 601, 182
P. 293 (1919) ........................................................................................ 12

S. S. Ansaldo San Giorgio I. vs. Rheimstrom Bros. Co., 294 U. S.
11
494 (1935) ··············································································
Sohm v. United States Fid. & Guar., 352 F.2d 65 (6th Cir. 1965).... 3
State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Cassinelli, 67 Nev. 156, 216
P.2d 606 (1950) .................................................................................... 7
Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New York, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172,
377 P.2d 284 (1962) ............................................................................ 12
United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U. S. 289, 326
(1942) ................................................................................................9, 10
TEXTS CITED
Annot. 18 A.L.R.2d 443 (1951) ................................................................ 7
Annot. 76 A.L.R. 23, 183 (1932) .............................................................. 7
Annot. 175 A.L.R. 8 (1948) ...................................................................... 12
§ 70A-2-302 Utah Code Annotated (Repl. Vol. 1953) .......................... 10

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE O,F UTAH
THOMAS R. BROADBENT,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

Case No.

UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND
GUARANTY COMPANY,
Defendant and Respondent.

12263

REPLY BRIEF
RE-STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The statement of facts contained in respondent's brief
1s incomplete in several particulars, and it is therefore
necessary to add the following facts to be considered in
conjunction with the statement of facts made in appellant's brief. At pages 4 and 5 of respondent's brief, respondent points to comments made by Dr. Broadbent to
the effect that Dr. Broadbent miscalculated the radium
dosage and the size of the tumor. Respondent also points
to statements of plaintiff that at the time the Radon seeds
were implanted he was not aware that his patient had
had prior radium treatment in Europe. Based on this discovery respondent notes that plaintiff wondered if his
1
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patient had received a cumulative dosage of Radon which
caused the adverse effects. Respondent failed to mention,
however, that Dr. Broadbent made all these observations
as part of his diagnostic attempt to isolate the cause of the
greater than anticipated effects; and that investigation
into the above matters all indicated no miscalculations or
over-dosages. In the first place, Dr. Broadbent did not
become aware of the prior radium treatment until January 11, 1957, several years after the implantation of the
Radon seeds. (Broadbent depo. p. 31). Upon investigation, Dr. Broadbent ascertained that the dosage in the
prior radium treatment had been trivial and that even
if he had known of the prior radium treatment, the dosage
which he had prescribed for his patient would have been
the same. (Broadbent depo. pp. 34-35). There was no
cumulative effect considering both radium treatments.
(Broadbent depo. p. 35). The dosage actually given to
the patient was very conservative. (Broadbent depo. p.
58). Dr. Broadbent recomputed the dosage given with
respect to the size of the tumor and ascertained that there
had been no miscalculation as to either the dosage or the
size of the tumor. (Broadbent depo. pp. 35-38).
Respondent also failed to mention that the patient's
side effects were caused only partially by the radium
treatment: the tumor itself and infection contributed significantly to the deterioration. (Broadbent depo. p. 36).
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE THIRD JUDIOAL DISTRICT COURT IN
AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, ERRED IN ENTERING SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANT AND RESPONDENT UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND GUARANTY COMPANY.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
A.

PLAINTIFF GAVE TIMELY NOTICE.

In countering plaintiff's cases respondent has cited
several cases involving professional liability insurance
policies which respondent asserts support his position that
proper notice was not given. Both appellant and respondent rely on Sohm vs. United States Fid. & Guar., 352
F.2d 65 (6th Cir. 1965). The facts of Sohm, as noted in
appellant's brief, are clearly distinguishable from the instant case. In that case, another physician showed Dr.
Sohm the surgical error that had been made and Dr.
Sohm still failed to notify his insurance carrier. As noted
in appellant's brief, the case clearly stands for the proposition which is supportive of plaintiff's position, that
notice need only be given when the physician actually becomes aware of the injury arising out of error, negligence
or malpractice.

Respondent also cites the cases of Falk vs. Sul America Terrestres Maritimos E. Accidentes Companhia De
Sequros, 465 P.2d 714 (Ore. 1970), and Bergh vs.
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Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 197 So.2d 847 (Fla. App.
1967). Those cases are also clearly distinguishable on
their facts. In the Bergh case plaintiff had received
a letter from his patient's attorney which recited a
claim for negligence against him, and had also been
sued by the patient prior to the time when notice was
forwarded to the company. In the Falk case, Dr. Falk
received a letter from another physician who informed
him that Falk had not detected an injury while treating
the patient. As can be noted in both of these cases, a
definite claim for negligence was made and the doctors
were unquestionably aware that a claim was or might
be made against them for malpractice. In the case at hand,
Dr. Broadbent received no complaints whatsoever during
the entire period of treatment. He verified the dosage,
both with the company and with other specialists. No
miscalculations, errors or omissions were detected or
brought to his attention by anyone. Only when he received the letter from his patient's attorney was he aware
that any claim would be made against him for negligence,
malpractice, or error.
Respondent also cites the Utah cases of Amundson v.
Mutual Benefit, Health & Acc. Assoc., 13 U.2d 407, 375
P.2d 463 (1962); Dunn v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
100 Utah 111, 110 P.2d 561, (1941), and Anderson v.
Beneficial Fire & Cas. Co., 21 U.2d 173, 442 P.2d 933
( 1968). These three cases are distinguishable either factually or legally from the instant case. In the first place
all three deal either with life or accident insurance policies
and involve situations where a beneficiary or an insured
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did not make proper notice from some clearly ascertainable date, such as the date of death or the date of a fire
loss. In the case at hand, there is no such clearly ascertainable date when it became clear to Dr. Broadbent or
anyone else that a claim could or would be made. The
date when plaintiff received notice from his patient's
attorney is the only clear ascertainable date in this case
which could be used as a guideline for setting a period
within which notice must be rendered. And, of course,
plaintiff rendered notice immediately after being informed
of the claim. From this standpoint defendant's cases have
no bearing on the instant case. Simply because the court
found improper notice in those cases does not make those
cases dispositive of the case at hand.
Respondent makes particular reference t o t h e
Amundson case primarily for the purpose of establishing
the six-year period of limitation applicable to written
instruments as the outside limitation for the filing of
notice under a professional liability policy. Assuming
Amundsen would have application to the instant case, Dr.
Broadbent complied. Once Dr. Broadbent received notice
from his patient's attorney, he immediately notified his
insurance company. That date is the only date from which
the time computation could be made. As noted above,
there was no prior definite time or event which could be
relied upon for the basis of the computation of the six-year
period. The most that can be said is that there was a
continuum of activity from the time the Radon seeds were
implanted until actual written claim was made. Any
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estimate as to a date or event prior to the date that the
written complaint was received from which the six-year
period of time could be said to run, would be based exclusively on conjecture and surmise.
In considering the impact of the Amundson case, it
must be realized that no subsequent Utah case has adopted
or expanded upon the rule of the six-year limitation.
Moreover, it must be recognized that the approach taken
by the court in that case is indeed novel and not supported
by any other decision or line of reasoning found by plaintiff or by defendant. It seems quite clear the holding in
Amundson must be confined to its facts and not extended
to other factual situations such as the one at hand where
there is no logic or reason to support the application of
such a limitation.
B.

LATE NOTICE, IF ANY, IS EXCUSED SINCE
PLAINTIFF REASONABLY BELIEVED NO
CLAIM FOR INJURIES WOULD RESULT.

Respondent seems to believe that appellants are relying exclusively on the doctrine of trivial occurrence to
excuse late notice as that doctrine is set forth in the case
of Johnson Ready-Mix Concrete Co. v. United Pac. Ins.
Co., 11 U.2d 279, 358 P.2d 337 (1961). Respondent mistakes appellant's position. The argument and cases cited
in appellant's brief stand for the proposition that one need
only report an injury the circumstances of which would
cause a reasonable and prudent man to suspect that a claim
might arise therefrom. Appellant's position is that the
events surrounding the treatment of Miss Gyr at no time
6
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indicated to a reasonable and prudent man that a claim
for malpractice would be made.
C.

LA TE NOTICE, IF ANY, IS EXCUSED SINCE
DEFENDANT WAS NOT PREJUDICED THEREBY.

Respondent contends that the great weight of authority in the United States is to the effect that the insurance
carrier need not establish prejudice. As primary support
for that proposition, respondent cites State Farm Mutual
Auto Ins. Co. vs. Cassinelli, 67 Nev. 156, 216 P.2d 606
(1950), Annot. 76 A.LR. 23, 183 (1932); and Annot. 18
A.LR. 2d 443 (1951). As is obvious, the latest cited
authority is 1951. Clearly, since 1951 the law in this
particular area and the weight of authority has shifted
drastically. Appellant would invite consideration of supplements to 18 A.LR.2d 443 and the cases cited therein
to the effect that the courts in at least 15 states where
the proposition has been presented have adopted the rule
that the insurer, in order to be relieved of liability,
must show that it has suffered prejudice because of the
insured's non-compliance with provision as to notice.
These states include most of the jurisdictions adjoining
Utah as indicated in appellant's brief.
Respondent further states that the insurer need not
prove prejudice especially in those cases where notice is
a condition precedent to suit on the policy. Respondent
cites only the Cassinelli case and various general propositions in the above referenced annotations which are presently out of date. The more current view is that the in-

7
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

surer must establish prejudice even if notice is set as a
condition precedent to suit on the policy. For example,
in the case of Cooper v. Government Employees Ins. Co.,
51 N. J. 86, 237 A.2d 870 (1968), notice was made a condition precedent to a suit on the policy. In that case the
court held that in spite of the provisions in the policy the
insurer had to prove appreciable prejudice. The burden
of persuasion was explicitly placed on the insurer. Cooper
v. Government Employees Ins. Co., supra, at 874. In the
case of Lindus v. Northern Ins. Co., 103 Ariz. 160, 438
P.2d 311 (1968) the Arizona Supreme Court held that
the insurer is not relieved of responsibility of proving actual prejudice even where the policy makes notice an express condition precedent to suit. See Lindus v. Northern
Ins. Co., supra, at 315. Attention is invited to the multitude of cases cited at that particular page supporting the
court's decision. Further attention is called to the Pennsylvania case of Frank v. Nash, 166 Pa. Super. 476, 71
A.2d 835 (1950), wherein the Pennsylvania court held
that the failure to furnish the suit papers to the insured
did not of itself avoid the policy in the absence of prejudice to the insurer even where the policy expressly made
compliance with the notice provision a condition precedent to the insurer's liability. For additional support, see
Joyce v. United Ins. Co., 21 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1962). Based
on the foregoing cases, the current trend is clearly away
from the proposition stated by respondent. The courts
are understandably recognizing that there is no necessity
of relieving the insurer from liability unless there is
prejudice; if the insurer is not disadvantaged, no harm
results in not relieving it from liability.

8
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D. PLAINTIFF'S REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS
AS A LAY PURCHASER OF LIABILI1Y INSURANCE SHOULD BE REWARDED.

Respondent objects to the underlying insurance contract
being treated as an adhesion contract and asserts that the
current judicial method of interpreting such contracts has
no place in our law. Respondent further objects to the case
of Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 409 P.2d 168
( 1966), stating that the referenced sections in appellant's
brief are sheer dictum. The case and the quotations therefrom are cited not for the holding but for the method used
in interpreting the underlying contract. Whether one refers to standardized contracts as adhesion contracts or by
some other name, the fact nevertheless exists that a considerable body of law has developed over the years interpreting these standardized contracts between individuals of disparate bargaining power which are given to
the individual on a "take it or leave it" basis. Respondent
asserts that both parties are bound by the clear and unequivocal terms of a contract regardless of the background
of the negotiations and other circumstances surrounding
the execution of the contract. The courts have traditionally
exercised wide discretion in enforcing strictly the terms
of a contract when strict compliance would result in an
injustice. As Justice Frankfurter stated in his dissent in
United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 326
(1942):
It is said that familiar principles would be
outraged if Bethlehem were denied recovery on
these contracts. But is there any principle which is

9
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

more familiar or firmly embedded in the history
of Anglo-American Law than the basic doctrine
that the courts will not permit themselves to be
used as instruments of inequity and injustice? Does
any principle in our law have more universal application than the doctrine that courts will not
enforce transactions in which the relative positions
of the parties are such that one has unconscionably
taken advantages of the necessities of the other?
These principles are not foreign to the law
of contracts. Fraud and physical duress are not
the only grounds upon which courts refuse to enforce contracts. The law is not so primitive that it
sanctions every injustice except brute force and
downright fraud. More specifically, the courts
generally refuse to lend themselves to the enforcement of a "bargain" in which one party has unjustly taken advantage of the economic necessities
of the other ....
Respondent states that he has been unable to find
any law involving adhesion contracts. By statute in Utah
the court may refuse to enforce a contract or a clause
therein if it is unconscionable. §70A-2-302 Utah Code
Ann. (Repl. Vol. 1953). In the area of express disclaimers
of warranties in standardized contracts and the refusal of
courts to enforce the same, appellant would refer the court
to the well-known case of Henningson v. Bloomfield
Motors, 32 N. J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). In that particular case the court refused to give effect to a disclaimer
of implied warranty of merchantability. In denying effect
to that part of the contract, the court stated as follows:
The traditional contract is the result of free
bargaining of parties who are brought together by
the play of the market, and who meet each other
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on a footing of approximate economic equality. In
such a society there is no danger that freedom of
contract will be a threat to the social order as a
whole. But in present day commercial life the
standardized mass contract has appeared. It is
~sed primarily by enterprises with strong bargainmg power and position. . . . Such standardized
contracts have been described as those in which
one predominate party will dictate its law to an
undetermined multiple rather than to an individual. They are said to resemble a law rather than
a meeting of the minds. Henningson v. Bloomfield
Motors, supra, at 86.
The court continued as follows:
The task of the judiciary is to administer the
spirit as well as the letter of the law. On issues
such as the present one, part of the burden is to
protect the ordinary man against the loss of important rights through what, in effect, is the unilateral act of the manufacturer. Henningson v.
Bloomfield Motors, supra, at 94.
The strict method of interpreting standardized contracts can be found in cases dealing with contracts involving baggage checks containing clauses restricting liability
of common carriers for loss or damage in transit; See S.S.
Ansaldo San Giorgio I. v. Rheimstrom Bros. Co., 294 U. S.
494 (1935); limitations on parcel checkroom tickets; see
]ones v. Great Northern Railway Co., 68 Mont. 231, 217
P. 673 (1923); on storage warehouse receipts; French v.
Bekins Moving & Storage Co., 118 Colo. 424, 195 P.2d
968 (1948); on automobile parking lot or garage tickets
or claim checks, Hoel v. Flower City Fuel & Transfer Co.,
144 Minn. 280, 175 N.W. 300 (1919); and also excul11
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l
patory clauses in leases releasing landlords of apartments
from liability for negligence, see Annot. 175 A.LR. 8
(1948). The same general principle has been applied to
the standardized bank passbook. See Los Angeles Inv. Co.
v. Home Savings Bank, 180 Cal. 601, 182 P. 293 (1919).
Based on the foregoing authorities, it is clear that
the strong interpretative stance taken by the courts against
the standardized contract is not new in the law. The case
of Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., supra, was cited only for the
proposition that the same method of interpreting adhesion
contracts has been applied to insurance contracts. For
additional support see Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of
New York, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172, 377 P.2d 284 (1962), with
particular emphasis on pages 294-97, and the footnotes
attached thereto.
Appellant again maintains that the standardized contract under question must be considered and interpreted
according to the guidelines set down by the courts, taking
into consideration the method of execution, and the expectations of the parties concerned. Dr. Broadbent as a
layman would reasonably expect that he should give notice
under the terms of his policy once he himself became
aware of any claim against him. This he in fact did. One
would not reasonably expect the doctor to make claim for
an injury not caused by negligence, malpractice or error
on his part and about which he had received no complaint.

12
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E.

THIS CASE IS NOT RIPE FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.

In the first place there is a factual issue as to whether

plaintiff gave timely notice under the policy. As is noted
in both appellant's and respondent's briefs, whether notice
was timely given or not depends upon the facts and cir~
cumstances of each individual case. The facts and circumstances can only be fully explored and developed at trial.
This appellant has not had the opportunity of doing. Witnesses and records need to be consulted which are not now
in the record. Respondent claims that the mere fact that
the reactions developed as they did is sufficient to warrant affirming the summary judgment. Appellant denies
this. Moreover, there is a factual question as to whether
notice would be excused under the circumstances of the
case. Respondent alleges this is merely a question of law.
To the contrary, this is an issue of fact, since the excuse,
if any, would be predicated on a factual finding that a
reasonable and prudent doctor acting in Dr. Broadbent's
place would or would not have had sufficient facts at
his disposal to cause him to tender notice. This determination can only be made after full exploration of all facts,
witnesses and evidence, some of which has not been placed
in the record and cannot be fully explored until trial.
Appellant also contends there is an issue of fact remaining as to whether defendant has been prejudiced by any
late notice. Again, this is a factual issue depending upon
when the duty to notify arose, and what actions defendant
could have taken, if any, to reduce any alleged prejudice.
This is a matter which can only be explored fully at trial
after full disclosure of all evidence. Based on the author-
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1t1es set forth in appellant's brief, it is again submitted
that there are genuine issues of material facts which remain in this case and which must be submitted to a jury.
CONCLUSION
Appellant again respectfully submits that no duty devolved upon Dr. Broadbent to render notice until the
actual complaint was made against him. If a duty devolved at an earlier time, the failure to render notice is
either excused as being not sufficient to indicate to a reasonable and prudent man that a claim would be made or
is excused because of lack of prejudice to the insurer. Appellant submits that the contract in question must be
interpreted most strongly against insurer and the reasonable expectations of the doctor should be rewarded. Material issues of fact remain in this case, and it is therefore requested that the court vacate the summary judgment entered by the lower court and remand this matter for further proceedings including trial.
Respectfully submitted,
HANSON, BALDWIN,
BRANDT & WADSWORTH

By
REX J. HANSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Appellant
702 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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